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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to observe and analyze whether the value system and political 
structure of a nation, gauged through its legal configuration, impacts its response to IMF debt and 
consequently impacts its GDP growth rates. This paper also analyzes whether involvement in the 
fund through a loan relationship affects the country’s real interest rate, inflation, exchange rate and 
import and export volume and whether this relationship is causal in that we can explain a nation’s 
loan relationship with the Fund through observance of the aforementioned variables. In this paper, 
we observe 34 emerging markets as defined by Dow Jones in 2010. 
The general consensus of the literature is that participation in IMF loan programs retards 
the economic growth of developing economies.  In light of this, the contribution of this paper is to 
illustrate that some of the slowed growth experienced by these countries seeking out IMF debt is 
explained by their value system and general attitude toward debt.  To carry out a comparable 
analysis we segment and group the emerging markets based on their current credit status with the 
IMF (as of Oct 2012) as well as by the origin of their legal system, a measure we use to assess their 
value system with respect to creditor and debt protection laws. We will observe the growth rates 
that these countries’ economies experience categorized by their involvement with the Fund, the 
amount of their loan and whether they fully repaid their debt or are currently indebted to the Fund. 
We will also identify the size and frequency of the loan in order to observe the impact that these 
variables have on the delayed growth rates that they experience. Furthermore, we will examine the 
impact on their GDP growth rates, imports of goods and services, inflation, exchange rates and real 
interest rates. We expect to find that there is not a generic relationship between involvement in a 
loan relationship with the Fund and GDP growth rates. In other words, having a loan from the IMF 
does not directly result in delayed growth rates, contrary to popular belief. However, we 
hypothesize that the legal system of the borrowing countries is an explanatory variable in 
determining their growth rates, alongside their loan relationship with the Fund. 
In addition, we expect to find empirical evidence that supports the claim that inappropriate 
and unmonitored involvement in the Fund can adversely affect emerging markets. Inappropriate 
and unmonitored involved is measured in this paper by the borrowers creditor and debtor 
protection laws. We aim to expand the current line of literature by analyzing whether a decline in 
economic growth prior to completion of an IMF loan program is a generic attribute of all 
participants or whether these traits are more pronounced in countries with a more unmonitored 
business and economic legal system. 
 
KEY WORDS: Emerging markets, the Fund, economic growth rates, corporate governance system, 
legal system, civil law, common law
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Introduction and Background 
This paper will aim to analyze the impact of the value system and legal system on the GDP 
growth rates of emerging markets. We observe the growth rates of these economies through the 
lens of their IMF loan relationship. Essentially, we will observe the responses of emerging markets’ 
growth rates contingent upon two specific factors, namely, their indebtedness to the IMF and their 
value system measured through their legal system. The effects of their legal system will be gauged 
by observing each country’s GDP growth rates, interest rates, imports, exchange rates and interest 
rates..  
Consistent in the line of literature is the consensus that the IMF is doing a poor job at 
engendering growth within the economies of countries that participate in their program. The Fund 
has taken hits left and right for being too rigid in the stipulations which they place upon member 
countries for funds to be disbursed. In addition, they have also been accused of being too generic, 
catering only to the needs of more developed nations, a target not initially set by the IMF. However 
in this paper, we aim to extend such claims by asserting that a nation that enters into a loan 
relationship with the IMF is not automatically doomed to retarded economic growth but their 
growth patterns can be gauged by assessing their value system through their attitude toward loan 
repayment as well as observing their debtor and creditor protection laws.   
According to La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney (2000), the investor 
protection structure of a country, which essentially stems out of its legal system, directly influences 
the real economy. The three major effects that stimulate economic growth are firstly, it enhances 
savings, secondly, these savings are channeled into real investments and thereby fostering capital 
accumulation and finally since financiers exercise a degree of control over certain investment 
decisions, resources are directed toward more productive uses and consequently more 
productively allocated, La Porta et al (2000).  
The value system in which we refer in the abstract is defined as in La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In their research, they highlight that the legal rules protecting 
investors along with the quality of protection provided differ significantly and systematically across 
countries. Essentially, some legal systems offer more protection to creditors while others more 
diligently protect the rights of the debtors. Evidently, there would be two main effects of these laws. 
Firstly, foreign investment would be directly affected since potential investors would invest where 
they have more investment protection and secondly, this would be a direct reflection of the states’ 
attitude toward having national debt.    
The legal systems of the world stem out of a few distinct origins. These are English, French, 
German and Scandinavian. English law, also known as common law is overseen by judges and as a 
result is incorporated into the country’s legislature. French, German and Scandinavian law on the 
other hand dates back to Roman law and is a part of the scholar and legislator-made civil law 
tradition, La Porta et al (1997).  Their findings also findings also indicate that richer countries 
enforce laws better than poorer countries. 
In retrospect, we consider emerging markets because according to The University of Iowa 
Center for International Finance and Development, emerging markets are countries that have 
strategically positioned themselves to experience rapid growth and industrialization [See Li, Chuan. 
(2012)]. These countries not only experience rapid growth spurts but award lucrative returns to 
risk loving investors in, among others, the areas of trade, technology transfers as well as foreign 
direct investments. Ashoka Mody in “What is an emerging market?” also describes it as the place 
where a country is positioned such that it is searching for an acute tradeoff between commitment 
and flexibility in contractual agreements [See Mody, Ashoka (2004)]. As noted by the World Bank, 
the five largest emerging markets on the globe are China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia [See Li, 
Chuan. (2012)].   
Undisputedly, emerging markets often suffer detrimentally from shocks that hit their 
economies. Unfortunately, oftentimes these shocks are not terribly severe and developed nations 
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generally completely recover from them.  One of the main characteristics of an emerging market 
that lends itself to the mercy of these shocks is the volatility of these underdeveloped nations. Since 
many developing countries are not fully stable, they are unable to withstand normal or, much less 
so, severe abnormalities that may hit their economies. As a result of the volatility of the economies 
of emerging markets, many of them that approach the Fund do so in a state of great distress and 
hopelessness. Consequently, the literature argues that countries are not rewarded for engaging in 
an IMF loan program but conversely experience slower growth rates after entering into the 
program in comparison to similar countries that were also experiencing adverse economic 
conditions and did not engage in an IMF loan relationship.  
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The IMF 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization reconstructed in 1944 with a 
defined mission to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate 
international trade, promote high employment levels, sustain economic growth and reduce poverty 
around the globe (About the IMF:www.imf.org). Feldstein (1998) notes that the IMF was originally 
formed to help countries cope with trade deficits and temporary shortages of foreign exchange but 
has a new emphasis on structural and institutional reform, an avenue that has not always been a 
part of the IMF’s agenda. 
Over the years the IMF has experienced significant growth with the world membership 
rising from 44 states in 1946 to 188 at present. However, each country does not have equal 
representation at the Fund. Countries are given voting rights paralleling a quota subscription that 
works similar to a credit union deposit in the IMF. Upon joining the fund countries pay 75% of their 
quota in their own currency and the remaining 25% in an international currency known as Special 
Drawing Rights or SDRs. Initially, the quota allocations were based on economic size measured by 
external trade volume as well as national income. Currently members’ quota is reviewed at least 
every five years by assessing similar variables.   
Combined, the emerging markets analyzed in this paper only represent 22.9% of the IMF’s 
voting rights. However, the majority of the decision making process is undertaken by 24 directors, 8 
selected because they are the largest shareholders and the remaining 16 are elected by the 
remaining countries. The United States alone carries 16.75% of the votes, followed by Japan at 
6.23% and Germany at 5.81%. Essentially, many decisions made by the IMF need a voting majority 
of 85% therefore the US alone in addition to three other major European countries can have a 
major influence on the decision of the Fund. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Member QUOTA (%) VOTES (%) 
China 4.00% 3.81% 
Russian Federation 2.50% 2.39% 
India 2.44% 2.34% 
Brazil 1.79% 1.72% 
Mexico 1.52% 1.47% 
Argentina 0.89% 0.87% 
Indonesia 0.87% 0.85% 
South Africa 0.78% 0.77% 
Malaysia 0.74% 0.73% 
Poland 0.71% 0.70% 
Turkey 0.61% 0.61% 
Thailand 0.60% 0.60% 
Kuwait 0.58% 0.58% 
Hungary 0.44% 0.44% 
Pakistan 0.43% 0.44% 
Philippines 0.43% 0.43% 
Romania 0.43% 0.44% 
Czech Republic 0.42% 0.43% 
Egypt 0.40% 0.40% 
Chile 0.36% 0.37% 
Colombia 0.33% 0.34% 
United Arab Emirates 0.32% 0.33% 
Bulgaria 0.27% 0.28% 
Peru 0.27% 0.28% 
Morocco 0.25% 0.26% 
Slovak Republic 0.18% 0.20% 
Sri Lanka 0.17% 0.19% 
Oman 0.10% 0.12% 
Lithuania 0.08% 0.10% 
Jordan 0.07% 0.10% 
Bahrain 0.06% 0.08% 
Latvia 0.06% 0.09% 
Estonia 0.04% 0.07% 
Mauritius 0.04% 0.07% 
Total * 23.18% 22.90% 
United States ** 17.69% 16.75% 
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Figure 1 shows the quota and voting rights allotted to the countries analyzed in our paper.  
Combined, the emerging markets studied jointly represent a quota that is barely larger than that 
allotted to the United States. Evidently, many decisions that are made by the Fund on behalf of these 
emerging markets are often in the best interest of the larger nations and not of these small, 
developing nations. Ironically, the primary purpose of the Fund was to supplement lower income 
countries and assist them in decreasing the balance- of- payments accounts. Now like many other 
NGO’s; they are being most heavily influenced by the countries that are least dependent on their 
services. 
We will observe 34 emerging markets as defined by Dow Jones in 2010 to determine 
whether countries indebted to the IMF, experienced slower growth rates solely as a result of 
engaging in an IMF loan relationship or whether their historical legal and value system play a role 
in the delayed growth rates of these nations. In addition, we will also observe the level of debt and 
the frequency in which these countries engaged in an IMF loan program.  We suspect that not only 
being indebted to the IMF will affect their ability to recover from the crisis but the size of the debt 
will play an integral role in these countries’ economic stability. Ultimately, we expect to find 
evidence to support our hypothesis that though the IMF may be at fault in enabling emerging 
markets in their downward spiral of accumulating debt from which they are unable to emerge; 
other factors are significant in explaining their delayed growth rates most importantly, their 
corporate governance laws.  
As noted in Barro and Lee (2005) any IMF lending program that a particular country 
engages in is often a reflection of their political-economic status. Their findings indicate that loans 
disbursed to countries in need tend to be larger and more frequent when the country has a stronger 
political and economic alliance with the United States or other major influential European 
countries. In addition, these loans are also more substantial when the borrowing country has more 
influential persons stationed on the IMF’s staff. 
They found evidence to support the claim that countries that have a higher IMF loan 
participation rate usually experiences declining economic growth. In addition, while they find no 
significant effects on other variables such as investment and inflation, they find a small negative 
effect on the said countries’ democratic rule of law.  
Research illustrates that countries that borrow larger loans from the IMF are more likely to 
experience a slowing in economic growth. This paper extends those studies by analyzing those 
countries that were able to fully repay their loans to determine whether their economic growth was 
more desirable than those emerging markets that struggled to complete loan repayment. We also 
aim to assess their performance contingent upon their value system.  
There are different types of loans issued by the IMF and according to Barro and Lee (2005) 
the type of loan disbursed or even agreed upon between the IMF and the borrowing nation is 
contingent upon their current economic status from an international standpoint. Two major types 
of loans provided as credits to member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties are the Stand-
by-Arrangement (SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programs. These loan programs were 
designed to provide short term loan assistance to countries in need. In addition to those, other 
short term loans have been introduced to supplement those programs. These include Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF), the Country Stabilization Fund (CSF), the Compensatory and Contingent 
Financing Facility (CCFF) and the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF). In general, a Stand-by-
Arrangement is extended over a period of one year to two years and repayment typically starts 
from three years to five years after the borrowing date. The Extended Fund Facility arrangement is 
generally stretched across the first three years with the repayment schedule beginning anywhere 
between year four and ten.  
However, for countries with more extreme and desperate economic conditions these short 
term loans were not sufficient to meet there needs. After being pressured, the IMF was forced to 
extend its programs and offer long term loans more directed toward lower income, higher need 
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countries. These programs, namely the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) were established to help lower income countries. They 
charged a subsidized interest rate of 0.5% and offered a repayment schedule of five to ten years 
after a five year grace period. The ESAF was later replaced by a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility 
(PRGF) and labeled as foreign aid rather than a balance of deficits reduction program.  
The economic status of a country is not the only factor that is heavily weighed when 
determining a country’s eligibility in loan approval. Another major contributing factor is each 
country’s share of IMF quota. Evidently, the countries that have the smallest economies are 
automatically placed in a position where their authority and decision making abilities in the Fund 
are limited. Ironically these countries are most in need of guidance and the decisions made by the 
Fund on their behalf are frequently not in their best interest. Though these quotas are updated 
every five years there are often limited changes in the progress many of these low income countries 
make. 
Essentially, this paper will aim to examine the effects that the legal affiliation of a country 
has on emerging markets segmented into categories distinguished by whether there currently 
exists a working relationship between the IMF and the specific country, the type of program 
engaged in with the IMF as well as the repayment status of the country. In addition, we will do 
further analysis on the frequency of the loans and the repayment status of each individual country.   
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Figure 2 
 
Period Stabilization Program Structural Program 
Total no. of 
loans 
  SBA EFF PRGF/ ECF FCLC   
            
1980 – 1984 Chile, Mauritius India     3 
1985 – 1989 
Chile, China, 
Mauritius, Morocco, 
Thailand 
Chile     6 
1990 – 1994 
Czech Republic, 
Egypt, India, 
Morocco, 
Philippines, 
Slovakia, Hungary 
Egypt, 
Lithuania, 
Philippines 
  Poland 11 
1995 – 1999 
Brazil. Egypt, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, Russia, 
Thailand, Hungary, 
Latvia, Turkey 
Bulgaria, 
Indonesia, 
Russia, Jordan 
    13 
2000 – 2004 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Jordan, Latvia, 
Pakistan, Romania, 
Turkey 
Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka 
Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka 
  13 
2005 – 2009 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Pakistan, Romania, 
Sri Lanka, Turkey 
    
Mexico, 
Poland 
8 
2010 – 2011 Romania, Sri Lanka     
Mexico, 
Poland 
4 
1980 -2011     58 
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Figure 2 is a list of countries and the type of loan program that they participated in. In the 
set of 35 countries, 58 loan programs were entered into by 25 countries. Many of these countries 
engaged in at least 2 or 3 arrangements each. The SBA (Stand-by- Arrangement) and EFF (Extended 
Fund Facility) are programs categorized as Stabilization programs whereas PRGF (Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility) /ECF (Extended Credit Facility) and FCL (Flexible Credit Line) are 
under the umbrella of Structural programs. 
The IMF has several programs in which they distribute funds to member countries. Stand- 
by- Arrangement (SBA) and Extended-Fund-Facilty (EFF) are two major short term balance-of –
payments programs in which repayments are due within 3-5yrs and 4-10yrs of disbursement 
consecutively.  However, after protest that these programs were not useful to lower income 
countries they introduced Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced SAF (ESAF) which 
allowed 5-10yrs for repayment after a 5yr grace period. ESAF was later changed to Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF).  
 
  
9 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3 illustrates the GDP of a sample of emerging markets that never received IMF credit 
within the period 1990-2011. This data was collected from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators, International Financial Statistics of the IMF, IHS Global Insight, and Oxford Economic 
forecasting, as well as estimated and projected values developed by the Economic Research Service 
all converted to a 2005 base year. [When this data was gathered, because of the use of fixed 
exchange rates, for consistent and accurate interpretation, the exchange rates of the 2005 USD was 
utilized in calculating the listed GDPs]. 
We can observe from this figure that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis there was not an 
extensive dip in GDP of countries who never undertook IMF credit and most of these economies 
were able to recover and grow after the end of the crisis. 
Figure 4 illustrates the GDP of countries who received IMF credit but has fully repaid the 
debt within the 1990-2011 period. From our diagram we can also observe that most of these 
countries were able to survive the 2007-2009 financial crisis and flourish after the fact. 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 5 highlights the GDP of countries between the 1990-2011 period, that are currently 
indebted to the IMF. In figure 3 it is easier to observe the drop in country GDP during the 2007-
2009 period. This drop that is conspicuous in Romania, Hungary and Latvia are not quite as 
common in countries that never undertook IMF debt or undertook debt but fully repaid it. 
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Hypotheses 
In this paper we test three main hypotheses regarding the relationship between the economic 
growth rates of emerging markets and their legal system. 
•         H1A: Involvement in the IMF only exemplifies the shortcomings of the country’s corporate 
governance system 
•         H1B: Emerging markets that have outstanding debt from the IMF are more exposed to 
economic hardships than countries that do not undertake IMF debt.  
•         H1C: Of countries participating in IMF loan programs, those that are of civil law tradition 
experience slower growth rates than those of common law tradition 
 
                  Emerging markets are generally most susceptible to become debtors of the IMF. The 
purpose of this paper is to transcend the current line of literature and show that involvement in an 
IMF loan program does not generically lead to slurred GDP growth rates for the borrowing country. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that the value system of a country, measured through its legal 
system (which determines its debtor and creditor protection laws) is an explanatory variable when 
observing and estimating the growth rates of a nation. Ultimately, we wish to show that countries 
that have more rigid and definitive creditor protection laws are more likely to experience higher 
growth rates that their peers that do not have such laws in place. These growth rates are therefore 
dependent upon the value system of the country and not entirely upon their credit relationship 
with the IMF as determined by other authors.  
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Literature Review 
In its purest and initial stages, the IMF was originally designed to help countries in distress 
reduce its balance-of-payments deficits. However, its role has constantly been evolving and many 
critics speculate as to whether this change has been at all beneficial to poorer member countries. 
Consequently, over the last two decades, the IMF has been constantly under intense scrutiny for its 
adverse effect on economic growth rates, (Hutchison, 2003; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; and 
Dreher, 2006).  
According to Abbott, Andersen and Tarp, 2010; the role held by the IMF began to show 
significant change after the oil crisis in 1970 and the international debt crisis in the 1980’s. During 
this period the Fund began to shift its focus toward devaluation and macroeconomic stability in 
order to reduce balance of payments owed by these countries and its new stance, to develop 
strategy and associated growth policies.  
Essentially, the IMF has been increasingly adamant about the purpose of its policies being to 
help lay a foundation for promoting long run economic growth. However, Stiglitz 2000, 2001, 2004 
and Vreeland 2006, have accused the IMF of constructing ‘one size fits all’ policies that ultimately 
are too rigid to benefit and meet the needs of underdeveloped nations. Others argue that it is in fact 
the incompletion of the program that plays a fundamental role in countries missing their target 
after engaging in a debt repayment program, Krueger, 2004. They find that the Fund may prove to 
be more beneficial if member countries participating complete the program in its entirety. In 
addition, Vreeland, 2003 argues that the policies of conditionality held by the Fund, this is the terms 
of the IMF loan agreement, redistributes income away from the poor. Evidently, this challenges the 
motivation of the IMF’s lead advisors and leads speculators to determine that the Fund is under 
political influences and not impartially driven by the sole function of reducing balance of payments 
deficits.  Consequently, in the 1990’s this led to the creation of new IMF lending facilities that was 
specifically geared toward assisting low-income countries and transition economies. Still, 
borrowing countries were not satisfied and accused the IMF of creating new policies that were 
intrusive, destructive for national ownership and ultimately contradicting the objectives set out by 
the Fund to accomplish. 
The main difference between countries engaged or seeking to engage in an IMF program 
and those that are not, is essentially that countries who seek out IMF assistance are generally in 
distress and the latter are usually in better economic health. As a result, it is not fit to hold the IMF 
responsible for the economic downfall or turmoil experienced by its program participants. 
However, upon completion or even during the course of the program, there should be some 
evidence indicating that the program entered into has had some form of a positive impact on the 
participating country’s economical position.   
A major study empirically measuring the economic growth rates of countries participating 
in an IMF program was conducted by Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000. In their study, the only 
division they made was whether a country was under or not under a loan agreement, making no 
distinction between the type of agreement entered into by the various countries. Their data which 
spun the period 1970 through  2000 emerged with 678 loan agreements. Within this sample, the 
average growth rate of total income was 3.33% with countries participating in the program 
experiencing an average growth rate of 2.04% and those not under program agreements growing at 
a rate of 4.39%. They concluded that after controlling for relevant factors, participation in IMF 
programs do in fact slow economic growth and ultimately, countries are not rewarded for 
adherence and participation. Barro and Lee 2005 also conducted similar research corroborating 
Przeworski and Vreeland’s story. They found that participation in IMF programs had significantly 
negative effects on a countries’ economic growth.  
In light of all the criticisms that the Fund has been receiving, Dreher 2006, conducted 
additional research accounting for the possibility that the IMF may be falsely held accountable for 
slowing the economic growth rates of participating countries because these countries were not 
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completing the program in its entirety. Dreher’s research comprised 3 accountability variables 
accounting for compliance with IMF conditionality. These factors were suspension from the IMF 
program; whether or not full amount agreed upon was disbursed; and the final variable, to account 
for whether the full amount agreed upon was withdrawn by the participating country. Even with 
this more in-depth analysis, controlling for compliance with conditionality, Dreher found that 
participation in the IMF program does in fact reduce a country’s economic growth rate and the 
overall effect was negative for the participating country.   
Analysis from yet another angle had been conducted by Easterly, 2005. In his research, he 
categorized IMF loan program participation as a dependent variable, one in which entirely depends 
upon the economic health of the nation, this assumption is perfectly rational since all countries 
approaching the Fund for a loan are either in great distress or on the verge of being so. He asserted 
that if the loan program was in fact working and beneficial to the participating country then the 
probability of receiving a new loan when a loan had already been issued should be decreasing, 
unfortunately in his findings this was not so. To this end, Easterly raised criticisms and concerns as 
to why the Fund repeatedly made loans to underdeveloped and developing countries when 
previous loans showed no signs of improvement to balance of payments and their economies.  
In retrospect, Dreher 2004 has found that the Fund has frequently been used as an 
insurance cover against adverse shocks to the borrowing nation’s economy. Consequently, they 
have also found evidence of moral hazard where countries taking loans reduce precautions they 
usually take to prevent a crisis and in other cases intentionally generate a crisis since they are 
equipped with these IMF loans. As a result, the Fund has been further criticized as being 
inappropriate in the conditions extended upon loan request. In some instances, they appear too 
rigid where the terms are so strict that countries most in need are unable to abide and therefore do 
not benefit whereas in other cases countries are able to create moral hazard and erroneously 
benefit from the Fund’s loan programs.  
Evidently, cases of this has been speculated upon and documented, particularly in the 
bailout case in Mexico in 1995. In this case, the Fund extended $18 billion US to Mexico. Here, it was 
believed that the decrease in the spread in the bond market of emerging economies and the inflow 
of international capital was a result of the IMF loan. However, this view was shattered when the 
IMF failed to prevent the default in Russia in 1998. They also indicate, concerning the findings in 
Mexico that net flows of short term foreign debt as a percentage of total external net debt flows are 
influenced by the IMF; proof of the moral hypothesis hazard that showed itself only after the 1995 
bailout.  
Bird, Hussain and Joyce, 2004 divides the Fund’s member countries into three basic 
categories, non-users, infrequent users and frequent or multiple users. In general, non-users have 
their balance of payments relationships under control and have access to enough credit and capital 
to seek out private loans. The infrequent users generally also have access to private capital but 
occasionally may hit a speed bump, run out of private capital, where they are forced to approach 
the Fund. The frequent or multiple users are usually in the most desperate position. They are in dire 
need of external capital, deemed most risky and therefore lack the credit and resources to approach 
private lending entities. To this end they must approach the Fund as a measure of last resort. Bird 
et al conjecture that balance of payments deficits experienced by many low income countries may 
in fact be a result of macroeconomic mismanagement, instability and poor domestic policy. 
Theoretically, these are precisely the type of policies that the Fund has been changed to rectify and 
improve.  
Their study makes two basic assessments about the type of borrowers and the challenges 
they face that causes them to be recurrent participants in the IMF loan programs. Bird et al 
distinguishes between two types of issues faced by many low income countries namely, illiquidity 
and insolvency. For infrequent borrowers, a benign liquidity problem may be easily rectified by a 
loan disbursement by the Fund and so they are able to overcome a crisis. However, for frequent 
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borrowers, their recurring participation in the Fund’s loan programs may be as a result of 
insolvency problems which, unlike liquidity issues, are more long term and intransient. Evidently, 
since insolvency problems are not easily corrected and certainly not by a mere loan from the IMF, 
these countries are often pushed to approach the Fund again and again just to maintain a functional 
economy. 
In addition to insolvency problems, they found that countries with weak bureaucratic 
institutions are also more likely to be incapable of implementing and adhering to policies adopted 
to restore external equilibrium and increase economic growth. Consequently, these countries may 
remain dependent on IMF funding for extended periods of time.     
Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000 in their study, determined that countries who enter into a 
loan agreement with the Fund do so because they are either desperate for foreign reserves or need 
to reduce budget deficits or both. They find that these programs reduce growth in these countries 
while they are under the program, and they never reap compensatory benefits when they complete 
or no longer participate in the program. In their analysis, Przeworski and Vreeland conjectured that 
perhaps countries need to experience slowing growth while under those specific types of economic 
crises (low foreign reserves or high budget deficits), however they find that countries who do not 
enter IMF loan programs with comparably high domestic deficits and foreign reserve crises still 
have higher growth rates than their comparable peers who participate in the Fund’s loan programs.  
 As noted in Bird (1996), the demand for IMF credits is positively correlated with balance - 
of -payments deficits and negatively correlated with availability of alternative means of financing. 
Evidently, balance - of - payments deficits is a direct spillover of domestic fiscal and monetary 
mismanagement, increased import prices and overvalued exchange rates. Ultimately, Bird 
concludes that since the IMF is a source of last resort lending it can be expected to be inversely 
related to the level of economic development in an emerging market. In addition, studies conducted 
around IMF lending suggests that the probability that a country will request IMF credit, in the short 
run, is positively related to its previous involvement with the Fund [See Bird (1996)].  
He also notes that many countries tend to resist borrowing from the IMF even if they are in 
dire need as a result of the perceived political cost attached. In addition while the Fund had high 
stipulations and conditions attached to borrowing researchers have found that the Fund relaxed its 
conditions and requirements necessary to receive credit immediately after the 1982 debt crisis.  
Consequently, it became easier at this time for countries to engage in IMF borrowing and 
thereby this action taken by the IMF increased the likelihood of countries being unable to repay, as 
well as the hold that the Fund had on their economy.  
Bird has also determined that since a loan from the IMF is laid out as temporary and 
revolving, receivership of the loan should be looked at as a failure on a country’s path. In addition, if 
the Fund’s program does not encourage economic improvement for countries who took credit but 
instead engender the same countries to engage in requesting additional credits without showing 
signs of paralleling improvement, the Fund has also failed at its pre-assigned purpose. 
Bird finds that though countries exhibit the criteria necessary to meet conditions to receive 
the Fund’s credit, the goal, of improving the country’s macroeconomic conditions are often left 
unrealized. While some argue that the Fund does a poor job on following up on the countries that 
undertake their debt to ensure that they comply with the conditions with which the money was 
lent, there is also speculation, arguing, that these countries may have been overachievers setting 
their goals unrealistically high [See Bird (1996)].  
Joyce (1992) finds that countries more likely to enter Fund arrangements are countries 
which have excessively high ratios of government expenditure to GDP and low ratios of 
international reserves to imports. These countries evidently exhibit signs of distress, hence 
contributing to the theory of failure on their part. Logit regressions conducted by Joyce on 29 
countries during the period (1972-1984) illustrate that the most significant determinants of a 
country’s likelihood to apply for IMF credit are inflation, export growth, the ratio of foreign 
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exchange reserves to imports, the ratio of external debt to GNP, the ratio of net foreign direct 
investment to GNP and the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation. In addition, it was also 
found by Edwards and Santaella (1993) that participation in an IMF program is also a determinant 
in a country’s likelihood to devalue its currency. 
Oftentimes the IMF has been accused of strategically positioning itself to have a semi-
permanent presence in many needy, developing countries. The programs that they initiate and fund 
sometimes enable countries in their downward spiral, causing them to be dependent on their (the 
IMF’s) funding for a long haul.  
In the 1980’s the only users of the Fund were developing nations. The need for IMF funding 
exponentially increased during the oil shocks of the 1970’s and the rapid growth of commercial 
bank lending in the 1980’s which led to the debt crisis. Initially the Fund worked as a credit union, 
pooling the funds of various countries with each being allowed to draw from it as necessary. After 
the crises of the 80’s and the oil shock of the 70’s the role of the IMF began to shift. The IMF began 
to act as a financial intermediary, borrowing resources from one group of countries and lending to 
another group of countries. As the Fund’s role began to change they started to take on a more 
political agenda encouraging its members to utilize their credit. Finally, the Fund was now being 
criticized for being part of the problem by taking resources from debtor countries instead of 
creating wealth.  
Essentially, in this paper, I intend to contribute to the literature by adding another layer of 
analysis on the work currently done on this topic. I will analyze the impact of a country’s legal 
affiliation on their IMF loan status, (that is whether they have fully completed loan repayment, have 
a current balance or never participated in an IMF loan program), their annual GDP growth rates and 
other temperature gauging variables of their economy including inflation and interest rates.  
The nature of the program, as argued by the decision makers of the Fund, is designed to 
help countries reduce balance of payments deficits, expand economic growth and increase the 
benefits of international trade. However, these benefits, they argue, will only be realized if countries 
adhere completely to the terms of the loan program and upon completion fully repay their debt. 
They claim that all these elements are necessary for a country to begin seeing the positive effects of 
completing the IMF loan program.  
In addition, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that countries repay loans to avoid 
developing a reputation for defaulting and thereby obstructing access to international capital. 
Alfaro and Kanczuk 2005, also argue that delaying repayment is a commonly observed feature of 
the process of defaulting which they label, “muddling through”. They claim that this process of 
delaying repayment tends to exacerbate a recession.  
Consequently, by making a distinction between countries that are currently engaged in an 
IMF loan program and those that have completed a program including repayment, we can make an 
assessment of whether the IMF should rule more strictly to discourage or deny loan applicants that 
are deemed most likely to default as it could have a negative impact on their overall economy in the 
long run.  
However, the contribution of this study is to analyze the impact that each country’s value 
system has on their economic growth while observing their involvement with the IMF. Ultimately, 
we want to analyze whether retarded economic growth is a generic result of participating in an IMF 
loan program, where the construct of the IMF and its policies are at fault or whether there are other 
explanatory variables. According to La Porta et al (1997) there is strong evidence to suggest that 
the legal environment of a nation has a large and significant impact on the size and breadth of the 
country’s capital markets. 
The legal systems considered in this paper are the historical legal partitions made in La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer and Vishney (2000). The main divisions are Common Law and 
Civil Law. Common law is of English origin while Civil law is of French, German and Scandinavian 
origin. La Porta et al (2000) identify how corporate governance affects the real economy of a nation 
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in three distinct ways. They illustrate that the investor protection structure of a nation, which 
essentially stems out of its legal system has a direct effect on the real economy.  Firstly, it enhances 
savings and then these savings are channeled into real investments fostering capital accumulation. 
Finally the result of a stable and dependable corporate governance structure engenders the 
resources of a nation being directed into industrious uses and ultimately being more productively 
allocated.  
Mina and Vasquez (2006) has also reinforced this assertion by noting that countries with 
poor and absent law enforcement institutions are generally unstable and indeed increase 
uncertainty about their structure. They also find in research that weak legal systems result in lower 
levels of international lending as investors with lower wealth levels find it unprofitable and too 
risky to invest internationally.  
In addition to observing the legal structure of the borrowing countries, we also observe 
their repayment status to confirm the reports of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Alfaro and 
Kanczuk (2005) who find that countries repay loans to avoid developing a reputation for defaulting 
and consequently obstructing access to international capital. Respectively, they also find that 
delaying repayment is a commonly observed feature of the process of defaulting which they label as 
“muddling through” and they conclude that this process of delaying repayment has a tendency of 
exacerbating a recession.  
Nonetheless, the main focus of this paper is to observe the impact of the value system of a 
country on its national debt, more specifically, its IMF debt. The motivation behind observing each 
nation’s value system is that according to La Porta et al (2000) investor protection laws directly 
influences the real economy. In addition, Beck, Levine, Loayza (2000) and Wrugler (2000) show 
that developing the financial constructs of a nation accelerates economic growth.  Most importantly, 
Levine and Zervos (1998); Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Carlin and Mayer (1999) highlights in 
their article that financial market development, assessed by using the legal origin of each nation as 
an instrument, predicts economic growth.  
We assess the value system as in David and Brierley (1985), La Porta et al (1997, 1998) who 
states that countries differ enormously in the extent to which they afford legal protection to 
investors. Conclusively, if countries differ in the extent in which they provide legal protection and 
these laws drive the economic and financial development of a nation then we can confer that these 
countries also approach their national debt in differently and consequently, these laws can be 
reflective of a nation’s attitude toward IMF debt. In essence we hypothesize that their internal 
corporate governance laws mirror their macroeconomic and political priorities.      
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Common Law and Civil Law Tradition 
La Porta and Lopez de Silanes (1997, 1998) are most thorough in describing the 
characteristics of Common Law and Civil Law traditions. Countries that follow common law 
tradition are most protective of shareholders, highly protective of creditors and provide companies 
with better access to external equity finance. In their research they find that common law countries 
have an outsider held stock to GNP ratio of 60%. This is indicative of the perks of the common law 
traditions which value the protection of shareholders. It provides evidence that rational investors 
are hesitant to invest in countries in which their investments and rights are not protected. 
Alternately, countries that abide by civil law tradition are less protective of investor rights. 
La Porta et al (1997, 1998) partitions countries of civil law tradition into French, German and 
Scandinavian origin and find that French and German Civil Law countries lack definitive investor 
protection laws. In addition, countries boasting of the French civil law system possess and average 
outsider held stock to GNP ratio of 21%, a mere third of the ratio held by countries of common law 
tradition.   Of the civil law tradition, countries of Scandinavian tradition have the best shareholder 
protection laws while countries of French Civil law tradition are the least protective of creditors.  
In addition to the impact of having investor protection laws that value shareholder rights, 
law enforcement is equally as critical. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) have found in their studies that 
investors do in fact enjoy high levels of protection despite bad laws if there is an efficient judiciary 
system in place. In their research they measure the level of law enforcement using the Business 
International Corporation, International Country Risk Guide. Their research also finds that richer 
countries enforce laws more effectively and generally have a less corrupt government, relative 
comparable governments.   
In line with the characteristics found present in civil law countries, French civil law 
tradition exhibits the worst quality of law enforcement, whereas German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries have the best quality of law enforcement within civil law constructs.  
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Figure 6 
Average GDP growth rates of Emerging Markets from 1981-2011 (%) 
Common Law Civil Law Civil and Religious 
India 6.27 Argentina 2.62 Bahrain 4.42 
Malaysia 5.96 Brazil 2.60 Egypt 4.97 
Mauritius 5.06 Bulgaria 1.87 Indonesia 5.35 
Pakistan 4.97 Chile 4.72 Jordon 4.52 
Philippines 3.16 China 10.09 Morocco 3.81 
South Africa 2.30 Colombia 3.47 Oman 6.29 
Sri Lanka 4.87 Czech Republic 2.08 United Arab Emirates 3.41 
Thailand 5.63 Estonia 1.92   
  Hungary 1.32   
  Kuwait 3.44   
  Latvia 1.59   
  Lithuania 1.63   
  Mexico 2.42   
  Peru 3.10   
  Poland 3.52   
  Romania 1.24   
  Russia 1.12   
  Slovakia 3.76   
  Turkey 4.33   
Average  4.78   2.99   4.68 
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Figure 6 shows that the average annual GDP growth rates of common law countries are 
highest followed by civil and religious law countries with civil law countries experiencing the 
weakest annual GDP growth rates. This shows preliminary support for our hypotheses that IMF 
loan engagement is not solely responsible for slurred growth rates experienced by emerging 
markets.  
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Methodology 
              In order to assess the role played by the legal structure of a country in determining its 
growth rates we do a Random Effects panel data analysis observing several variables including the 
loan relationship that the country has with the Fund.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of a country’s legal system on their IMF 
involvement.  We will observe the annual GDP growth rates of emerging markets, when segmented 
and grouped collectively by observing these countries’ IMF relationship and legal structure. We will 
identify whether they are involved in an IMF program, the size of the loan, their current repayment 
status and whether their debt is completely cleared. To observe the effect of each legal system we 
will examine their GDP growth rates, imports of goods and services, inflation, exchange rates and 
real interest rates. The contribution I intend to make with this paper is to assess whether countries 
perform poorly because they engage in an IMF loan program or whether their annual growth rates 
are also dependent on their legal system in addition to them participating in the IMF loan program.
The emerging markets that I will consider are countries defined as emerging markets by Dow Jones 
in 2010. This list includes Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. Though there are 
many more emerging markets across the globe, these selected, as defined by Dow Jones, have more 
easily attainable historical data available.  
First we gather data on our 34 emerging markets regarding loans solicited from the IMF, the 
amount of the loan the frequency in which each country engaged in an IMF program. This data is 
publicly available on the IMF’s official website.  
The GDP growth rates according to Bartelsman and Beaulieu in ‘A Consistent Accounting of 
US Productivity Growth’, is the sum of income received by all sectors of an economy in a country. It 
includes all wages, taxes and profits less subsidies and this number should reflect the market value 
of all final goods and services made within the borders of the country in a specific year. 
Consequently, this is a good indicator of measuring the temperature of an economy. For this reason 
we consider GDP as a major explanatory variable in determining a the impact of a country’s legal 
system. 
Tables 1-4 are some preliminary analysis of the variables in question. 
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Table 1 
 
 
Descriptive  Statistics of countries’ annual GDP growth  rates (in percentages) ove r the period 1981-2010 
Country Mean Std Dev Variance Minimum Maximum 
China 10.09 2.83 8.01 3.80 15.20 
Oman 6.29 5.08 25.79 -3.44 17.05 
India 6.27 2.26 5.13 1.06 9.82 
Malaysia 5.96 4.04 16.29 -7.36 10.00 
Thailand 5.63 4.55 20.71 -10.51 13.29 
Indonesia 5.35 4.07 16.55 -13.13 9.08 
Mauritius 5.06 2.18 4.74 0.38 9.74 
Pakistan 4.97 1.99 3.96 1.01 7.92 
Egypt 4.97 1.87 3.51 1.08 9.91 
Sri Lanka 4.87 1.91 3.67 -1.55 8.01 
Chile 4.72 4.42 19.54 -10.32 12.28 
Jordan 4.52 4.96 24.64 -13.45 18.66 
Bahrain 4.42 4.51 20.38 -7.56 12.87 
Turkey 4.33 4.41 19.47 -5.70 9.49 
Morocco 3.81 4.68 21.91 -6.58 12.22 
Slovakia 3.76 8.86 78.50 -14.57 42.12 
Poland 3.52 2.63 6.92 -7.00 7.09 
Colombia 3.47 2.26 5.10 -4.20 6.90 
Kuwait 3.44 10.77 116.04 -19.03 33.99 
United Arab Emirates 3.41 6.96 48.43 -18.78 17.53 
Philippines 3.16 3.52 12.37 -7.32 7.63 
Peru 3.10 6.15 37.83 -11.80 12.82 
Argentina 2.62 6.51 42.40 -10.89 12.67 
Brazil 2.60 3.32 11.05 -4.39 7.99 
Mexico 2.42 3.64 13.28 -6.22 8.77 
South Africa 2.30 2.42 5.85 -2.14 5.60 
Czech Republic 2.08 3.53 12.46 -11.61 6.81 
Estonia 1.92 7.37 54.35 -21.17 10.80 
Bulgaria 1.87 5.30 28.05 -9.12 10.94 
Lithuania 1.63 7.69 59.15 -21.26 10.25 
Latvia 1.59 9.26 85.82 -32.12 12.23 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rates. These include the mean, 
standard deviation, variance, minimum and maximum of each country. We can observe that Kuwait, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania have the highest standard deviation of growth rates from 1981-2010 
whereas rapidly growing economies like China, Oman and India have the highest mean growth 
rates. This is indicative of the steadily increasing growth rates of more stable economies in spite of 
shocks experienced, as expected.  
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Table 2 
 
 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics of annual mean GDP in billions from 1981-2010 
 Mean Std Deviation Variance Minimum Maximum 
China $  1,262.17 $  1,036.35 $      1,074,014.61 $         216.31 $     3,834.55 
Russia $     719.16 $     138.46 $            19,170.19 $         484.77 $         943.87 
Brazil $     712.19 $     170.77 $            29,162.93 $         476.71 $     1,092.51 
Mexico $     663.47 $     158.23 $            25,035.69 $         460.50 $         935.60 
India $     527.64 $     292.24 $            85,401.51 $         201.39 $     1,241.58 
Turkey $     335.60 $     121.62 $            14,791.33 $         162.49 $         564.02 
Poland $     227.07 $        74.75 $              5,587.47 $         136.60 $         382.46 
Indonesia $     202.78 $        85.72 $              7,347.64 $           80.88 $         377.28 
South Africa $     196.83 $        44.21 $              1,954.95 $         147.13 $         288.44 
Argentina $     152.27 $        40.19 $              1,615.02 $         106.38 $         253.62 
Thailand $     118.52 $        52.84 $              2,792.52 $           41.77 $         210.08 
Colombia $     113.13 $        34.52 $              1,191.77 $           66.38 $         183.22 
Czech Republic $     103.95 $        19.02 $                  361.64 $           77.92 $         144.67 
Romania $        90.30 $        14.21 $                  202.05 $           70.71 $         123.89 
United Arab Emirates $        88.64 $        37.33 $              1,393.41 $           45.58 $         165.23 
Malaysia $        88.02 $        44.72 $              1,999.45 $           30.82 $         171.47 
Hungary $        87.04 $        14.20 $                  201.73 $           69.71 $         112.81 
Chile $        78.25 $        35.20 $              1,239.30 $           32.32 $         138.73 
Pakistan $        78.08 $        31.21 $                  973.88 $           32.79 $         139.62 
Philippines $        76.78 $        23.91 $                  571.82 $           49.28 $         131.14 
Egypt $        68.61 $        28.01 $                  784.31 $           30.80 $         131.24 
Peru $        62.90 $        19.00 $                  361.14 $           43.75 $         112.14 
Slovakia $        52.88 $        15.22 $                  231.73 $           29.45 $           85.84 
Kuwait $        52.85 $        21.14 $                  447.08 $           28.60 $           95.24 
Morocco $        44.33 $        14.65 $                  214.53 $           24.63 $           75.41 
Bulgaria $        24.63 $          4.46 $                    19.86 $           19.58 $           34.80 
Oman $        22.41 $          9.52 $                    90.72 $             7.01 $           42.38 
Lithuania $        21.39 $          4.66 $                    21.72 $           13.91 $           31.67 
Sri Lanka $        17.08 $          7.24 $                    52.35 $             8.01 $           33.25 
Latvia $        12.77 $          3.16 $                    10.00 $             8.12 $           19.80 
Estonia $        10.26 $          2.66 $                      7.07 $             6.68 $           16.42 
Bahrain $          9.00 $          4.12 $                    16.98 $             4.38 $           17.82 
Jordon $          8.78 $          3.61 $                    13.01 $             4.60 $           16.74 
Mauritius $          4.35 $          1.86 $                      3.44 $             1.79 $             7.82 
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Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics on the emerging markets GDP in billions. As in 
Table 1 we want to observe and analyze the mean, variance, maximum and minimum of the GDP of 
the emerging markets represented in our data set. It is noteworthy to observe that China, Russia, 
Brazil and Mexico also have among the highest average GDP. These emerging markets are as 
aforementioned, the fastest growing in the world. 
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Table 3 
 
 
Debt incurred by countries through IMF lending 
Country Total Amt drawn in SDR's (millions) IMF credit status 
Argentina 23,478,810.00 0 
Brazil 62,128.72 0 
Turkey 36,099.00 1 
Indonesia 11,104.82 0 
Romania 10,100.00 1 
Hungary 7,693.70 1 
Russia 6,926.16 0 
Pakistan 6,262.46 1 
India 6,107.93 0 
Thailand 2,760.00 0 
Mexico 1,939.50 0 
Philippines 1,908.63 0 
Chile 1,370.25 0 
Latvia 982.24 1 
Bulgaria 867.62 0 
China 597.73 0 
Jordan 341.06 1 
Poland 283.30 0 
Morocco 276.40 0 
Sri Lanka 205.89 1 
Egypt 147.20 0 
Lithuania 134.55 0 
Mauritius 98.50 0 
Czech Republic 70.00 0 
Slovakia 32.15 0 
Bahrain 0.00 -1 
Colombia 0.00 -1 
Estonia 0.00 -1 
Kuwait 0.00 -1 
Malaysia 0.00 -1 
Oman 0.00 -1 
Peru 0.00 -1 
Qatar 0.00 -1 
South Africa 0.00 -1 
United Arab Emirates 0.00 -1 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is an asset of the IMF known as international reserves designed to supplement the reserves of 
its member countries.   
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Table 3 notes the total amount drawn by the emerging markets over the period 1980-2009 
as well as the IMF credit status of each emerging market. This data is divided up into 3 variables:  -1 
for “never received credit from the IMF during our time period 1980 to 2009”, 0 for “received credit 
from IMF but currently has no outstanding debt” and 1 for “received credit from IMF and still 
carries a balance on the account.” 
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Key Variables 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR:   
IMF purchases are total drawings on the General Resources Account of the IMF during the year 
specified, excluding drawings in the reserve tranche. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___: 
This variable is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER: 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received 
from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, 
travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of 
employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01: 
This variable is the annual growth rate of imports of goods and services based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Imports of goods and services 
represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and 
other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and 
government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly 
called factor services) and transfer payments. 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC: 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost 
to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly.  
LOANSTAT:  
This variable represents the status of each country’s IMF loan involvement. There are three 
categories represented in this variable. 1, 0 and -1. If the country is currently indebted to the IMF, 
as of 2012 they get a label of ‘1’, if they once owed the IMF but now have a zero balance, they are 
labeled ‘0’ and if they never engaged in an IMF loan program they are labeled as ‘-1’.  
OECDMEM: 
This variable represents each country’s membership status with the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. If the country is a member of the OECD they are given a ‘1’ and if they 
are not they are given a ‘0’.  
 OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__: 
Official exchange rate refers to the exchange rate determined by national authorities or to the rate 
determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based 
on monthly averages (local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar). 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____: 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
LEGAL: 
This variable represents the legal system of a country. If the country follows Common Law rule, 
they get a ‘0’, if they follow Civil Law rule they get a ‘1’ and if they follow Civil and Religious Law 
rule they get a ‘-1’ . 
LEGALCIVCOM 
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This variable is a broader categorization of the legal system of each country and makes no 
distinction between Civil Law and Civil and Religious Law. If they follow Common Law rule they are 
given a ‘-1’ and if they follow Civil Law rule they are given a ‘1’. 
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Table 4a 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests among variables 
Lags: 2 
  
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. 
    
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 687 2.174 0.1145 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 1.3029 1.303 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 810 0.460 0.6314 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 9.3898 9.390 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 896 0.763 0.4665 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 6.6417 6.642 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 814 0.094 0.9105 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 6.8150 6.815 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 947 6.241 0.0020 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 3.9356 3.936 
OECDMEM does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 947 0.095 0.9092 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause OECDMEM 2.4760 2.476 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 661 0.065 0.9375 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 3.8692 3.869 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 679 2.959 0.0525 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 0.5204 0.520 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 633 0.062 0.9398 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 0.0247 0.025 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 689 9.978 0.0001 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 1.5001 1.500 
OECDMEM does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 689 57.603 0.0000 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause OECDMEM 0.0428 0.043 
OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 683 0.441 0.6437 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ 1.2550 1.255 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ does not Granger Cause IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR 513 7.240 0.0008 
IMF_PURCHASES__DIS__CURR does not Granger Cause REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ 1.5162 1.516 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 810 11.987 0.0000 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 8.4777 8.478 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 744 4.543 0.0109 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 3.1046 3.105 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 812 6.607 0.0014 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 0.2568 0.257 
OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 801 7.420 0.0006 
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Table 4b 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ 1.3927 0.2490 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 625 4.4150 0.0125 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_01 does not Granger Cause REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ 6.2939 0.0020 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 817 0.1467 0.8636 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 3.5862 0.0281 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 908 2.0820 0.1253 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 0.4726 0.6235 
OECDMEM does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 908 4.7671 0.0087 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause OECDMEM 0.9634 0.3820 
OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ does not Granger Cause 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 
882 2.9787 0.0514 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ 0.4107 0.6633 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ does not Granger Cause IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER 682 0.2776 0.7577 
IMPORTS_OF_GOODS_AND_SER does not Granger Cause REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ 1.7908 0.1676 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 835 1.6691 0.1890 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 0.1975 0.8208 
OECDMEM does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 835 0.2383 0.7880 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause OECDMEM 0.0524 0.9490 
OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 831 0.1072 0.8983 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ 0.0147 0.9854 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ does not Granger Cause INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC 633 6.4301 0.0017 
INFLATION__CONSUMER_PRIC does not Granger Cause REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ 45.4015 0.0000 
OECDMEM does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 1020 0.0922 0.9120 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause OECDMEM 0.8620 0.4226 
OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 935 0.1594 0.8527 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause OFFICIAL_EXCHANGE_RATE__ 13.2660 0.0000 
REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ does not Granger Cause LOANSTAT 693 3.6939 0.0254 
LOANSTAT does not Granger Cause REAL_INTEREST_RATE____ 0.3577 0.6994 
 LEGAL_STAUS does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 734 1.60378 0.20184  
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause LEGAL_STAUS 0.63715 0.52909  
LOAN_STATUS does not Granger Cause GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ 734  
8.57563 
0.00021 
GDP_GROWTH__ANNUAL___ does not Granger Cause LOAN_STATUS  
3.18623 
0.04190 
LOAN_STATUS does not Granger Cause LEGAL_STAUS 798 0.70758 0.49315 
LEGAL_STAUS does not Granger Cause LOAN_STATUS 2.50492 0.08233 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
34 
 
The results of Table 4a and 4b highlight the causal relationships that exist between our 
variables. Loan status in our study is represented by a dummy variable that takes three values. 1, if 
the country currently owes the IMF, 0 if the country has fully repaid their debt to the Fund and -1 if 
the country never engaged in an IMF loan relationship. Legal status is also a dummy variable we 
incorporate where countries that are common law are labeled -1 and those that are civil law are 
labeled 1.  Using only countries that at some point, participated in an IMF loan program (loan 
status=1,0) we find that legal status granger causes loan status. This is significant at a 10% level.  
Our results also indicate that loan status Granger Causes imports of goods and services at a 
1% level of significance. This attests to the extent of the impact that a relationship with the Fund 
has on an economy as well as the importance of completing a loan program in the Fund that has 
been started. 
Another important relationship is that at a 1% level of significance, OECD membership Granger 
Causes IMF purchases made through the Fund. IMF purchases are the first step of the loan program 
that a country engages in with the IMF.  The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) is an organization whose mission is to create a forum to promote policies to improve 
the economic and social wellbeing of the people around the world. Further analysis will show that 
countries who are members of the OECD are less likely to approach the Fund for a loan, also 
supporting current literature of the necessary restructuring that needs to take place within the IMF.  
The variables used in this analysis are loan status, GDP annual growth rates, IMF_purchases, 
imports of goods and services ( both % of GDP and annual % of growth), inflation (annual % of 
consumer prices), official exchange rate (period average), real interest rate, political affiliation and 
OECD membership. These variables were gathered from the IMF website, OECD website and The 
World Bank database.  
To conduct our analysis we use Random Effects panel data since panel data is useful to 
allow us to control for variables that you cannot observe or measure. Essentially, it accounts for 
individual heterogeneity. This is particularly valuable in our analysis since we are considering 
country specific variables and there will be country specific factors that will influence our dataset 
though ultimately impossible to capture in its entirety.  
In addition, we employ the Random Effects model because we assume that the variations 
across countries are assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables 
included in our model. In addition to rationalizing our assumption, we also ran a Hausman test that 
tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors to decide between random and 
fixed effects. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects 
model as noted in Green, 2008.  
In addition to the Hausman test, we also conducted a Lagram-Multiplier test for serial correlation. 
Our results indicated that no serial correlation exists among our independent variables to 
unreasonably inflate our R2.  
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Analysis and Results 
Table 5 
 
                     Endogenous   Variables 
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Loan Status Signif IMF Purch Signif 
Legal -0.1827029 0.0170** 1.62*108 0.196 
Constant -0.1774945 0.020 3.67*108 0.003 
Chi square 5.70 0.0169** 1.67 0.1964 
R square 
(overall) 0.0386 0.0089 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
 
 In Equation 1 our sample consist of loan status (1,0): i.e. countries that currently owe the IMF and 
countries that completely repaid their IMF debt, i.e. debt=0. The exogenous variable is such that 
Civil law countries=1 and common law countries= -1.  
In Equation 2 we use the same sample, loan status (1,0), with the same exogenous variable except 
our endogenous variable is Loan Amt (IMF purchases) instead of loan status. 
Results of equation 1 indicate that legal status is a significant variable in determining loan status, 
equation 2 which tries to determine the relationship between loan size and legal status is not 
significant.  
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Table 6 
 
                   Endogenous variables  
Equation 3 
GDP growth Signif 
Legal -0.7907769 0.090 
Constant 4.130469 0.000 
Chi square 2.87 0.0901* 
R square 
(overall) 0.0164 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
 
Equation 3 shows the relationship between the economic growth rate of a country and its legal 
status. Our sample consists only of loan status (1,0). That is countries that currently owe the IMF 
and countries that fully repaid its IMF debt. The negative coefficient on legal status indicates that 
common law countries (legal=-1) experiences a positive growth rate while engaging in IMF debt 
and civil law countries (legal=1) experiences declining economic growth while engaging in IMF 
debt. This is a very significant finding in this paper 
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Table 7 
                              
                                                                      Endogenous Variables 
 
Equation 4 Equation 5 
Loan Status Signif IMF Purch Signif 
Legal -0.1753489 0.140 1.05*108 0.185 
AnnGDPgrwthRt -0.0058817 0.431 -7.99*107 0.000*** 
ImportsGoods 0.0029636 0.303 -1.36*107 0.001*** 
Inflation -0.0021432 0.001*** 2584027 0.073* 
OfficialExchangRt 0.0001501 0.000*** 35671.26 0.452 
RealInterestRt -0.0004189 0.897 3.94*107 0.000 
Constant -0.0420226 0.806 9.75*108 0.000 
Chi square 39.78 0.000 100.13 0.0000 
R square (overall)  0.0408  0.1940 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
 
 Equation 4 uses the loan status of (1,0) to determine the relationship between loan status and legal 
status in the presence of control variables. The control variables we use are GDP growth rate, 
imports of goods and services, inflation, official exchange rate and real interest rate.  After 
controlling for those variables, the relationship between legal status and loan status diminishes. 
The legal status is no longer a significant variable in explaining loan status.  
Equation 5 which has the current balance of the borrowing country as an endogenous variable 
yields similar results. 
This finding indicates that other variables are instrumental in determining the loan status of 
a country. Those significant variables are inflation and official exchange rates. This is consistent 
with the findings of Joyce (1992) who highlights that countries with high inflation and currency 
exchange rates are most likely to enter into an IMF loan program. 
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Table 8 
 
                                                  Endogenous Variables 
 
Equation 6 
OutstBal:TotBrw Signif 
AnnGDPgrwthrate -0.0036785 0.028** 
ImportsGds -0.0001133 0.888 
Inflation -0.0001014 0.455 
OfficialExchangRt -3.84*106 0.600 
RealInt -0.0003378 0.636 
Constant .9127678 0.000 
Chi square 4.97 0.4190 
R square (overall)  0.0003 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
 
 
In equation 6 we explain the outstanding balance as a proportion to total amount borrowed from 
the Fund using control variables minus the legal status of the county. Results of this equation 
indicate that annual GDP growth rates is the only explanatory variable, outside of legal status that 
can explain the outstanding balance held by borrowing countries.  
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Table 9 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level 
 
 
In table 9 we use several variables to help determine the GDP growth rates of the emerging markets 
in question. Dotsey (1998), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) reveal 
that the variables most significant in determining GDP growth rates are annual gross national 
income growth rates, inflation, consumer price index, adjusted income, savings and exports of 
goods and services.  
Equation 7 predicts the growth rates of countries prior to engaging in an IMF loan relationship 
while equation 8 predicts the growth rates of countries after receiving IMF funding.  
The Appendix displays graphical representations of the actual GDP growth rates versus the 
projected pre-loan growth rates.  
 
 
 
  
 
                                Endogenous Variables 
Equation 7 (before loan) Equation 8 (after loan) 
GDP grwthrt Signif GDP grwthrte Signif 
GNI annual growth 1.023543 0.000 .8956706 0.000 
Inflation  .002585 .002585 -.0004619 0.051 
CPI .0151571 0.090 .0003015 0.822 
AdjustnetAnnIncome -.0212387 0.284 .0016713 0.899 
AdjustedSavings   -.0018674 0.890 -.0029269 0.652 
ExportsGdsServices .0066375 0.371 .0151194 0.006 
Constant -.0973662 0.624 .3723657 0.005 
Chi square 4598.83 0.0000 7177.05 0.000 
R square (overall)  0.9952  0.9182 
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Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The results obtained from our Random Effects regression models present some specific 
information about the relationships that exist between engaging in an IMF loan program and the 
economic temperature of the emerging markets studied.  
In equation 1, we try to determine the relationship between the loan status and legal status 
of a country. We only considered the emerging markets that were engaged, at some point, in a loan 
relationship or is currently in a loan relationship. We find that legal status is an explanatory 
variable to the endogenous factor, loan status. We also found in our causality tests that legal status 
granger causes loan status. This is very significant as it illustrates the main point of this paper. That 
is that the legal status of a nation plays an instrumental role in it approaching the Fund in the first 
place. 
In equation 3 we try to determine the relationship between legal status and GDP growth 
rate. We find that this relationship is significant. Though we did not find that legal status granger 
causes GDP growth rates, there does exist a significant relationship between the two variables. 
We also, in equation 4, attempted to gauge the relationship between loan status and legal 
status when considering control variables. We found that in the presence of our control variables, 
legal status was not significant in determining loan status.  
Equation 6 proved that the outstanding balance held by the borrowing nation as a 
proportion of the total amount borrowed was explained only by GDP growth rates. Furthermore we 
conducted an analysis to determine the growth rates of countries prior to being a debtor to the 
Fund. Consistent in the line of literature we find that the IMF does in fact slow economic growth 
rates but most importantly, the loan status of a country is explained by its legal status. 
As we wanted to determine, the legal status of a country which incorporates it debtor and 
credit protection laws in addition to its value system affects its relationship with the Fund, it also 
affects other economic factors within the nation as expected. 
Consistent with our findings, El-Erian, (2007); Evans and Finnemore, (2001); and Momani, 
(2007) all agree that in order for the IMF to be effective in low-income countries they must undergo 
organizational reform both at the Board and staff level. Though they may experience growth as a 
result of an IMF loan, it becomes almost insignificant if they are negligent in their laws and do not 
use the loan as intended. Ultimately, we can conclude that better corporate governance laws would 
in fact lead to better macroeconomic policy and increase the economic conditions of these emerging 
markets.  
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Appendices 
Loan status =1 
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